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Abstract 
Tobacco policy in the UK and Japan has diverged markedly. In the 1980s, both countries 
oversaw regimes with minimal economic and regulatory policies. Now, the UK has 
become one of the most, and Japan one of the least, controlled (advanced industrial) states. 
These developments are puzzling to public health scholars who give primary explanatory 
weight to scientific evidence and a vague notion of ‘political will’, because policymakers 
possessed the same evidence on the harms of tobacco, and made the same international 
commitment to comprehensive tobacco control. Instead, we identify the role of a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic in policy environments, facilitating policy change in the UK but not 
Japan: policymakers accepted the scientific evidence, framed tobacco as a public health 
epidemic, placed health departments at the heart of policy, formed networks with public 
health groups and excluded tobacco companies, and, accentuated socio-economic 
conditions supportive of tobacco control. This dynamic helps explain why the UK became 
more likely to select each tobacco policy control instrument during a series of ‘windows 
of opportunity’. Such analysis, generated by policy theory, is crucial to contemporary 
science/ practitioner debates on the politics of ‘evidence-based policymaking’: the 
evidence does not speak for itself, and practitioners need to know how to use it effectively 
in policy environments.  
 
Keywords 
Comparative policy – UK – Japan – tobacco control – policy environments – multiple 
streams approach – evidence-based policymaking 
Introduction  
Tobacco policies in the UK and Japan were similar in the 1980s. Both countries 
maintained policies that, by today’s standards, indicate minimal control (Baggott, 1988: 
5). Since then, the UK has produced one of the most, but Japan one of the least, 
comprehensive tobacco control policies among developed countries (Cairney et al, 2012: 
148). Both have introduced many new policy instruments, but the UK’s have been quicker, 
more restrictive, and more consistent with the World Health Organisation Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, despite that fact that both countries support the FCTC.  
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These major differences are puzzling: policymakers faced similar conditions, possessed 
the same scientific evidence on the harms of smoking and passive smoking, initially 
responded in similar ways, but then produced very different policies. Public health 
accounts of such changes give most positive weight to the scientific evidence of harm and 
the campaigning efforts of public health groups, and negative weight to the cynical role 
of tobacco companies and lack of political will (2012: 6-9; Feldman and Bayer, 2004). 
The latter is too vague, and fails to account for key policy dynamics. Political science 
explanation often explores those dynamics by tracking the interaction between three Is - 
institutions, ideas, interests - in each country. We go two steps further. First, we focus on 
the five main factors which constrain or facilitate attempts by policymakers to purse major 
change: the many actors interacting at multiple levels of government, the institutions or 
rules and norms in each venue, the networks which favour some actors over others, the 
dominant ideas or ways of thinking about particular problems, and socio-economic 
conditions and events (Cairney, 2016; Cairney and Heikkila, 2014).  
 
We describe the interaction between these factors as the policy environments more or less 
conducive to policy change. This comparison helps explain policy divergence by focusing 
on the mutually reinforcing effects of each factor rather than trying to quantify their 
separate effects (Cairney et al, 2012; Cairney and Mamudu, 2014; Mamudu et al, 2015; 
Studlar and Cairney, 2014). It prompts us to identify: the key actors in multiple venues, 
their attempts to shift policymaking responsibility from some venues to others, the 
networks between policymakers and influential actors, the ways in which actors compete 
to frame policy problems and secure the dominance of one way of thinking, and the 
socioeconomic context to which they respond.  
 
We identify an environment conducive to major tobacco control in the UK. Key 
policymakers became more likely to: accept the scientific evidence on the harm of 
smoking and passive smoking; frame tobacco routinely as a public health epidemic 
requiring a major government response; place health departments at the heart of policy 
development; form networks with medical and public health groups at the expense of 
tobacco companies; and, exploit reduced smoking prevalence and greater public support 
for control while downplaying the economic value of tobacco.  
 
These developments did not take place in Japan. At the national level, policymakers 
remain likely to frame tobacco restrictions without reference to a public health 
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‘epidemic’; treasury departments are more central; they have strong and enduring links 
with a powerful tobacco company (JTI); and, they interpret socio-economic factors such 
as public behaviour and economics differently. Only in some sub-national governments 
did key policymakers frame tobacco as a public health issue which required stronger 
action. 
 
Second, we enhance this broad explanation of policy change overall with in-depth 
analysis of the mechanisms of key changes in specific policy instruments. We use 
‘multiple streams’ analysis to identify the specific sequence of factors and events that lead 
to discrete ‘windows of opportunity’ for each policy change (Kingdon, 1984; Jones et al, 
2016). Drawing on the example of one key instrument – legislation to ban smoking in 
indoor public places - we show the dual importance of (a) a policy environment generally 
conducive to change, and (b) the motive and opportunity for policymakers to select 
particular solutions. This motivation is greater in the UK, but each policy change remains 
contingent on timing and opportunity.  
Tobacco policy in the UK: a shift from minimal to comprehensive control 
UK post-war tobacco policy exhibits remarkably rapid policy change following decades 
of continuity (Cairney, 2007a: 45; Cairney et al, 2012: 99). In the late 1980s, most studies 
identified limited tobacco control and little prospect of change. Baggott (1988: 6) 
compared policy in Norway and the UK, identifying a similar focus of policy instruments 
but a major difference in weight: Norway introduced statutory measures to control 
practices such as advertising and including toxic ingredients in cigarettes, and the UK 
relied on voluntary agreements with the industry. By today’s standards, the latter are 
considered to be ineffective and a reflection of a strong relationship between government 
and industry (Baggott, 1986; 2014). Most accounts confirmed the latter, which formed 
during World War Two and endured for decades (Read, 1992; Taylor, 1984; Baggott, 
1988).  
 
Since 2007, the UK has topped the ‘tobacco control scale’, measuring the implementation 
of a comprehensive set of control measures in Europe (Joossens and Raw, 2014).  UK 
Government policy changes include: legislation to ban tobacco advertising (2002), ban 
smoking in almost all public places (2006), increase the minimum age for the sale of 
cigarettes from 16 to 18 (2007), introduce plain packaging for tobacco products (2015), 
and ban smoking in private cars with children present (2015); high levels of taxation 
designed to reduce smoking demand (from the 1980s), coupled with more customs 
enforcement; higher spending on smoking cessation services; and a shift towards 
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unequivocal health education (see Cairney et al, 2012: 101-2).  
 
There is some debate about the nature of UK policy change (Cairney, 2007a: 49), based 
on the extent to which voluntary measures represented a step towards, versus a way to 
delay, tobacco control (Baggott, 1986), and therefore if change has been incremental or 
punctuated (Studlar and Cairney, 2014: 514; Cairney et al, 2012: 104). However, all 
accounts identify major change since the 1980s. 
 
There is more debate on the weight we should attach to specific sources of policy change. 
For example, globally speaking, centrist and left wing parties are generally more in favour 
of tobacco control than right-wing/ pro-business parties, but tobacco control generally 
does not prompt major partisan debate, and a ‘moving consensus’ develops when one 
party introduces controls and others do not reverse them (Author et al, 2012: 85; 154; 
172). Still, in the UK, we witnessed a shift in approach from a centre-right Conservative 
party overseeing key policy changes (most notably, on taxation) but rejecting the 
European Union’s agenda on measures such as bans on tobacco advertising (Duina and 
Kurzer, 2004: 67), to a centre-left Labour party which accelerated policy change 
significantly from 1997 and generally went far beyond minimum European Union 
standards. In that context, the EU also seems to be a key player, but is less influential than 
in countries, such as Germany, in which there is more resistance to change (indeed, a 
Germany-Japan comparison would be more useful to gauge the EU effect). Similarly, 
while, devolved governments (established in 1999) provided new venues sympathetic to 
tobacco control, they produced similar policies to the UK Government (Author, 2007) 
and facilitated issue expansion to a lesser degree than Albaek et al (2007) find in the US 
(Cairney, 2007a; Cairney et al, 2012: 106).  
 
Most accounts explain change broadly with reference to two factors related to the ‘politics 
of evidence-based policymaking’ (Cairney, 2016; Cairney et al, 2016): policymakers use 
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ shortcuts to turn too much information into a simple way to 
define and solve a policy problem; and, they do so within a policy environment that 
provides constraints and opportunities for action (Cairney, 2016; Cairney and Heikkila, 
2014).  
 
This focus helps us explain why the scientific evidence on smoking and then passive 
smoking was influential in the UK, but took two to three decades to translate into a 
proportionate policy response (Cairney et al, 2012: 117-8). The evidence – on the links 
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between smoking and ill health (the problem), and regarding the most effective ways to 
discourage smoking (the solutions) only helps reduce uncertainty. Ambiguity remains 
because policymakers can understand a policy problem in different ways by accentuating 
one issue over another: smoking kills, but tobacco is an economically valuable product. 
Scientific evidence matters when actors use it successfully to reframe the ways in which 
policymakers primarily understand and seek to solve policy problems. In this case, it took 
decades to persuade policymakers to reconsider the dominant way of thinking about 
tobacco, from an economic good to be supported to a public health epidemic to be 
eradicated.  
 
Public health actors faced two challenges, to persuade policymakers: to accept 
unequivocally the evidence on ill health from smoking (published from the 1950s, 
producing a medical response and an incremental government strategy from the 1960s) 
and passive smoking (published from the early 1980s but only ‘set in stone’ in 
government from 1998); and, to produce tobacco controls proportionate to the problem 
(Cairney, 2007a). In both cases, there was a significant gap between policymakers 
accepting the evidence on health, accepting the need for evidence-based interventions to 
reduce smoking, producing a proportionate response, and finally taking the need for 
‘comprehensive’ tobacco control for granted (Cairney and Studlar, 2014). 
 
These actions took place within a ‘policy environment’ which only began to facilitate 
rather than constrain major policy change after several decades, during which the 
following all took place: key policymakers reframed tobacco as a public health epidemic; 
they allowed health departments and units to take responsibility for tobacco control; so, 
key network dynamics shifted, from a post-war close network between the industry and 
government to the dominance of medical and public health groups; and, those groups 
helped exploit shifts in socio-economic conditions. Smoking prevalence in the UK was 
82% for men and 41% for women in 1948, 35%-31% in 1986, 30%-26% in 1998, and 
22%-17% in 2015 (ASH, 2015). Reduced prevalence helped reduce opposition to tobacco 
control, and reduced tobacco tax revenue (from a high of 15% to a low of 3% of overall 
tax receipts) – combined with government commitments to reduce reliance on it - lessened 
the incentive to avoid greater control (Author et al, 2012: 115).  
 
It is difficult to describe the primary driver of change when each dynamic reinforces the 
other, but we can still describe a crucial role for (a) scientific evidence, in contributing to 
public awareness and reduced prevalence, and (b) key actors seeking policy change. 
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Tobacco control advocacy became more important from the 1980s: public health and 
epidemiological groups grew in stature and their attitudes hardened. An increasingly 
effective ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), set up (1971) by the influential Royal 
College of Physicians, joined with an increasingly organised British Medical Association 
(BMA) (and, eventually, key cancer charities such as CRUK) to generate support for 
tobacco control in the Department of Health (Cairney et al, 2012: 113). They used the 
evidence of smoking harm to challenge ‘laissez faire’ regulations within government and 
encourage shifts in public behaviour. This pressure helped prompt actors in government 
either to shift their primary understanding of tobacco or give way to actors in other venues 
more sympathetic to tobacco control. Actors in favour of control used multiple venues 
(the WHO, EU and devolved governments) and international experience to make the case 
for evidence-based solutions. So, evidence played a part in explanation but, ‘no single 
factor explains this change. Rather, they are all necessary but insufficient conditions for 
major policy change’ (2012: 120). 
Tobacco policy in Japan: explaining inertia and minimal change 
Tobacco policy in Japan did not follow the UK’s trajectory. It is one of the least controlled 
advanced-industrial countries (Cairney et al, 2012: 144). In many ways, its national policy 
regime resembles that of the UK in the late 1980s: it has overseen the introduction of a 
smaller number of measures, less quickly, with a greater emphasis on voluntary measures, 
and with limited measures to ensure implementation: ‘Until recently there were few 
central-level laws except for health warnings on cigarette packages [and] some limitations 
on smoking in public transportation’ (2012: 148). Only from the 2000s did it begin to 
introduce major health warnings on cigarette packs, and significant tax rises on tobacco. 
Most other restrictions on smoking in public places are partial and voluntary, and only 
stronger in a very small number of prefectures such as Kanagawa (2012: 149). Some 
municipalities introduced regal regulations to ban smoking on city centre streets. Further, 
regulations of advertising tobacco on television, newspaper, magazine, and billboards and 
in public transportation have been introduced as a voluntary agreement since the 1980s 
(Levin, 2005). 
 
This slower process of change takes place because the reinforcing dynamics that we 
identify in the UK - both specific (party and venue) and broad (policy environment) - are 
largely different from Japan. Japan generally does not elect left-wing parties more in 
favour of the state regulation of business, with one important exception: the election of 
the Democratic Party of Japan, taking power from 2009-12 and raising tobacco taxes by 
around 40% in 2010 (Buerk, 2010). Rather, politicians of the centre-right and pro-
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business governing party have close relations with tobacco industry groups. According to 
research by the Japan Society of Tobacco Control (2014), the political federation of 
national tobacco sellers and the political federation of tobacco leaf farmers make major 
donations to the Liberal Democratic Party and over 100 LDP politicians. From 2010-12 
it was ￥41 million (approx.￡0.29 million). Such donations receive minimal public 
attention compared to the likely reaction in the contemporary UK (although a £1m 
donation by Bernie Ecclestone to the Labour Party in 1998, allegedly to delay a 
sponsorship ban in Formula 1, was not as controversial as it should have been – Duina 
and Kurzer, 2004: 71).  
 
Further, there is far less scope for issue expansion via venue shopping. In particular, there 
is no equivalent to the EU which can seek to enforce a tobacco control agenda on ‘laggard’ 
countries such as Germany (Author et al, 2012: 76). Japan is a signatory to the WHO’s 
major global tobacco control agreement (the FCTC), and its set of comprehensive policy 
instruments, to: maintain high prices, protect individuals from second-hand smoke, 
regulate tobacco product ingredients, introduce health warning labels on at least 30% of 
the product, provide health education, ban tobacco advertising and promotion, support 
smoking cessation services, control the illegal trade of tobacco, ban sales to under-18s, 
support relevant litigation against the industry, support economic alternatives to tobacco 
leaf growing and manufacture, and monitor and implement the FCTC effectively 
(Mamudu et al, 2015: 860). However, its obligation and commitment to implementation 
is far less clear.  
 
For example, on the one hand, the FCTC contributed to a revision of the enforcement 
regulation of the Tobacco Industrial Act to display warnings on health on packaging in 
Japan (Tanaka, 2014).and: “a handful of administrative actions, i.e., guidelines, white 
papers, and recommendations from central government agencies and their advisory 
bodies, have helped move forward a tobacco control policy agenda” (Levin, 2013: 480). 
On the other hand, there remains national opposition to a comprehensive ban on smoking 
in public places. The Health Promotion Act of 2002 had promoted voluntary self-
regulation among owners and administrators of public facilities and workplaces. In 2011, 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare tried to amend the Industrial Safety and 
Health Act to enforce a ban on smoking in workplaces outside assigned smoking spaces. 
However, the Ministry gave up its introduction of the bill to the National Diet when likely 
majority opposition became clear (Tanaka, 2014). The government still encourages weak 
control measures - voluntary self-regulation, education, communication, training, and 
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public awareness – and has not followed the FCTC stipulation to cut ties with the tobacco 
industry.  
 
Such gaps, between commitment and action, can be explained broadly with reference to 
its policy environment which is far less conducive to tobacco control: policymakers frame 
tobacco restrictions without reference to a public health ‘epidemic’; treasury departments 
are more central; they have strong and enduring links to the industry; and, they value the 
tobacco economy. So, the role of scientific evidence is often less apparent in Japan 
because key actors downplay its significance and weigh up its policy implications in 
economic terms.  
 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare encourages the diffusion of “evidenced-
based” information (Chief of Health Service Bureau of Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, 2010) and Japan produced some of the earliest evidence on passive smoking 
(Hirayama, 1981). Yet, policymakers are more likely to protect the tobacco industry, leaf 
tobacco farmers and small size business owners (Cairney et al, 2012: 58; 68; The Asahi 
Shimbun, 12/06/2012; The Mainichi Shimbun, 20/02/2014), by supporting positive 
economic frames and pursuing less effective tobacco control frames, including a focus on 
courtesy and the benefits of ventilation when identifying a policy solution to 
environmental tobacco smoke (Bialous et al., 2006). 
 
The business of producing, selling and advertising of tobacco is regulated by the Tobacco 
Industry Act (1984). It prescribes “the sound development of national economy and . . . 
stable fiscal revenues” by advancing “the sound development of our nation’s tobacco 
industry”. The taxation of tobacco is also regulated by law and tobacco business in Japan 
is under the guidance of Ministry of Finance (Levin, 2005). Japanese policy on partial 
bans on smoking in public places also reflects some policymaker acceptance of the 
suggestion, promoted by tobacco companies but opposed by public health groups, that 
proper ventilation can minimise the health consequences of environmental tobacco smoke 
(Bialous et al., 2006). Tobacco control advocates, such as the Japan Society for Tobacco 
Control, remind policymakers that the scientific evidence on harm, and on effective 
policy instruments to reduce it, should translate into comprehensive tobacco control. 
However, there remains a significant gap between accepting the evidence on health, 
accepting the need for evidence-based interventions to reduce smoking, and pursuing a 
proportionate response with reference to the sense of urgency and epidemic fostered in 
countries like the UK.  
10 
 
 
This greater attachment to an economic frame reflects and reinforces key dynamics which 
differentiate Japan from the UK: the Ministry of Finance has not given way to Health, a 
close network between the industry and government still exists, and, there is a smaller 
shift of policymaker attention from tobacco revenue and economic activity towards 
indicators of support for tobacco control such as shifts in public opinion or smoking 
prevalence (prevalence among men reached 80% before the 1970s, falling to 30% by 
2016; for women it peaked at 15% and is now below 10% - Author et al, 2012: 160; Japan 
Times, 2016).  
 
The tobacco industry was once of major importance in both countries but a major 
challenge to its status has only happened in the UK. Crucially, the UK has a relatively 
pluralistic political culture to facilitate public competition between groups and highly 
public criticism of government and industry. In Japan, while public health and medical 
groups campaign for tobacco control, they do not lobby policymakers as aggressively and 
publicly as the UK’s groups. There is no politically active public health profession to keep 
tobacco control on the agenda and maintain pressure on government. Evidence does not 
speak for itself (Author, 2016), and there are fewer actors to speak loudly for evidence-
driven tobacco control. 
 
Further, Japan Tobacco International was once owned by the Japanese government and 
enjoyed a monopoly over domestic production. One third of stock of JTI is still held by 
the government. It is now the third largest tobacco company in the world (Japan Tobacco 
Inc, 2015). JTI has ‘immense financial resources to hire publicists, lobbyists, attorneys, 
and other personnel as needed’ for its global tobacco lobbying efforts (Cairney et al, 2012: 
62), as well as a reputation as a source of lucrative employment for former Ministry of 
Finance civil servants in Japan. They give it a continued presence in tobacco policy 
networks in Japan that are identifiable, albeit difficult to measure when using sources in 
the public record (Levin, 2005; 2013). 
 
In the UK, tobacco taxation is 3-4% of tax revenue and the government now favours high 
levels to discourage smoking rather than secure income. While tobacco revenue in Japan 
is not higher (1.8% of national tax revenue and 3.1% of local tax revenue in 2014 - JTI, 
2017), policymakers value it more highly. The Ministry of Finance values the 
convenience of a routine fiscal resource, alongside dividends from JTI, particularly 
during the current period in which the economy is fragile and the government would 
11 
 
struggle politically to increase VAT or other major taxes. In addition, the Ministry of 
Finance shares taxation receipts with subnational governments, and so the benefit of 
tobacco taxation extends to several venues. Further, policymakers at multiple levels are 
reluctant to harm small businesses by, for example, introducing bans on smoking in bars 
and clubs. While tobacco industry influence often seems behind-the-scenes, small 
business groups are more vocal and seem more like veto-players: small business is 
important to politicians and no level of government would take the blame for business 
closures. This issue has specific significance because local governments often ban 
smoking in the street (partly to reinforce social manners), which makes it more difficult 
to ban smoking indoors. Instead, governments subsidise businesses to install ventilation 
and smoking rooms, particularly when bars are on high floors and it is inconvenient to 
smoke outside.  
Tobacco policy beyond the centre: the role of subnational policymaking  
These gaps between the UK and Japan at the national level could be offset by subnational 
policy developments. However, there is more evidence of policy innovation in the 
subnational UK, and only some spread of stronger tobacco control in a small number of 
Japanese prefectures. These differences reflect general UK/ Japan differences in 
devolution and the specific extent to which new venues provide new ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for tobacco policy change. 
 
In the UK, subnational policy innovation reflects (a) the introduction of devolution in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1999, which (b) reflects the calls from these 
territories for a level of political autonomy, linked to high levels of national identity 
(particularly in Scotland). Their level and strengths of responsibility vary, but all three 
direct health policy and most aspects of public health (although Wales and Northern 
Ireland rely on the UK Government to produce legislation). This takes place in a system 
in which there is a National Health Service under the control of the UK and devolved 
governments, a relatively strong distinction between UK and devolved policy 
responsibilities in health, and the relative absence of local authority involvement in most 
aspects of health delivery (Greer, 2004; Birrell, 2012; Keating, 2010; Cairney and 
Mamudu, 2014; Cairney, 2011).  
 
This division of responsibilities has rarely translated into divergences in tobacco policy, 
because: the UK made major tobacco control changes before devolution; it still controls 
key aspects, such as the regulation of advertising, taxation, and customs enforcement; it 
committed the UK as a whole to the FCTC; the EU directs other measures, such as the 
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regulation of ingredients; and, all the UK and devolved governments express a 
commitment to stronger tobacco control measures in areas such as health education, 
smoking cessation, and the regulation of smoking in indoor public places (Cairney, 2009; 
Asare et al, 2009).  
 
In Japan, devolution has taken a very different form to the UK, reflecting an economic 
driver for self-government and the general absence of an identity-driven constitutional 
settlement (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2013). The concept of regionalism (‘do shu sei’) is 
relatively ambiguous, defined as creating a sub-governmental unit between the state and 
second-tier local government, and transferring administrative and fiscal powers to 
regional public bodies, which are branches of the national administration. Principal 
objectives relate to: regional economic development; administrative reforms to reduce the 
number of national civil servants; mergers of prefectural governments; and, integration 
of branches of functional ministries into one regional public entity to coordinate public 
policy (Yamazaki, 2010). Economics trumps health in devolution policy. 
 
Further, there is less subnational autonomy than in the UK: the present two-layer Japanese 
central-local governmental system is characterised by the concept of uniformity, 
immobility and complementarity. In 1947, the revised constitution and Local 
Autonomous Law introduced homogeneous and uniform local government. Each 
prefectural government and municipality were in principle to be treated equally (Nishio, 
2001). Further, Japan’s central government is a vertical structure which is divided among 
functional ministries and lacks integrative powers to consolidate them at the centre or 
region. These functional ministries, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIAC) in charge of local government and administration, have proven 
reluctant to allow exceptions in the local government system. The prefectures and 
municipalities tend to be uniformly managed (Kanai, 2007). Japanese central and sub-
national government also tend to seek cooperation and consensus, formally and 
informally, and to share responsibilities in areas such as healthcare and tobacco control 
(Yamazaki, 2015). 
 
There is some evidence that the national government has reduced its supervisory role and 
increased the autonomy of local governments. For example, in 1999, the Comprehensive 
Law on Decentralisation enlarged the discretion of local governments through abolishing 
the system of agency delegation with the powers to impose central services on local 
governments. It also helped relax central government regulations of the staff, facilities 
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and committees of local government (Nakano, 2010; Muramatsu et.al., 2001). This places 
most executive power in a governor or mayor, the chief executives of administrative 
departments, directly elected along with local assembly members by the electorate. The 
Local Autonomy Law authorises the governor and mayor to exert legislative power 
introducing by-laws, and the assembly to possess a power to pass any bills and introduce 
private members bill and committee bills (Ohsugi, 2008).  
 
Consequently, local governments now have greater discretion to legislate by-laws, 
interpret laws and regulations differently, and introduce fines to regulate behaviour 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2009). The Local autonomous Law 
was amended to redefine the general rules of administrative fine which can be enforced 
by local government. Since then, the number of local governments which introduced by-
laws with administrative fines has been growing (Kitamura, 2003). This new competence 
has enabled them to produce distinctive public policies, such as by-laws banning smoking 
public places in two prefectural governments or banning smoking on the street in the area 
of city centre in a number of municipalities, although such policy innovation is still 
limited by central direction.  
 
Overall, while policy remains centralised in terms of legal and financial systems, local 
governments are able to exert a certain degree of power (Rhodes, 1988; Samuels, 1983; 
Reed, 1986; Muramatsu, 1997; Ito, 2001). Consequently, there are some examples of 
subnational policy innovation, but the pressures for uniformity are so high that it takes a 
major expenditure of political will to innovate to a major extent. In both countries there 
is devolution, and therefore greater potential for issue expansion, but the central 
government public health agenda and scope for devolved government innovation in 
health are both stronger in the UK. 
From broad to specific explanation: case studies of policy instruments 
Detailed case studies allow us to turn a broad explanation of tobacco control, based on 
the use of scientific evidence in multi-level policy environments, into a specific series of 
decisions and events to produce key policy changes. Using the case study of case of bans 
on smoking in indoor public places, we demonstrate the need to combine a general 
discussion of policy trajectory with specific context, events, and choices to determine the 
fate of each policy instrument. Our expectation is that major policy changes in the UK 
are difficult while in Japan they often seem almost impossible.  
 
To that end, we adapt Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams analysis, which describes the 
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ways in which policy changes when three ‘streams’ come together during a window of 
opportunity: there is high attention to a policy problem; a solution exists; and, 
policymakers have the motive and opportunity to adopt it. We reinforce contemporary 
scholarship which highlights, for example, the role of policy transfer when solutions are 
developed in other countries and/ or sub-national jurisdictions do not have full control 
over the decision to import solutions (Ackrill et al, 2013; Bache & Reardon, 2013; 
Cairney, 2009; Cairney and Jones, 2016; Cairney and Zahariadis, 2016; Jones et al, 2016; 
Liu et al, 2011; Zahariadis, 2014). In the case of smoking in public places, we examine 
examples in which: there was high attention to smoking as a public health problem; a 
solution, to ban smoking partially or completely in public places existed; but, 
policymakers had the opportunity to select one of many variants (strong or weak) of the 
same solution. 
 
In the UK, all four governments eventually pursued an almost complete ban on smoking 
in indoor public places in the mid-2000s (followed by a ban on smoking in private cars 
with children present in 2015) but their ‘windows of opportunity’ differed in each case, 
based on: 
 
 Attention to, and framing, the problem. There was high attention in all four areas 
in the early to mid-2000s, but actors used the evidence on public opinion 
differently: advocates of control highlighted opinion in favour of a smoking ban 
(around 80%), while opponents highlighted the opposition to a full ban (also 80% 
in many cases); advocates stressed majority support in government consultations, 
while opponents stressed equivocal survey opinion (Cairney, 2009: 478-9). For 
example, the UK Government identified low survey support (20%) for a full ban 
when promoting exemptions for pubs and clubs, while the Scottish Government 
highlighted 56% in favour of no exemptions in its consultation (2009: 479). 
 The development of feasible solutions mediated in the policy community. It took 
time for interest groups to become interested in devolved policy in Wales and 
Northern Ireland, at least until the early to mid-2000s when it became clearer 
that there was scope for discrete policy change. In Scotland, medical and public 
health groups had a greater presence, working together in the cross party group 
to propose legislation (relatively unopposed by an industry that did not take 
devolution particularly seriously) (2009: 481).  Further, while the UK 
Government was learning from US experience, in which key states introduced 
partial and incremental bans, the Irish experience of a complete ban had a marked 
15 
 
influence on devolved agenda. The potential for devolved policy innovation then 
fed into Westminster debates on policy change for England (2009: 483).  
 The motive and opportunity to select a solution. Labour was generally more in 
favour of some form of tobacco control, and was the party in government in each 
area bar Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland there was cross party support for 
tobacco control to emulate that of Ireland (2009: 477). Wales was the first to 
express a commitment, but it lacked legislative powers. In Scotland, the 
opportunity for the Scottish National Party (then in opposition) to pursue a 
member’s bill, representing the cross party parliamentary group on tobacco 
control, helped keep the issue high on the agenda (Cairney, 2007b). After some 
uncertainty and hesitancy, the Scottish Government was the first to pursue a 
comprehensive ban in 2005. Northern Ireland was the last to pay attention to this 
issue (during its suspension of devolution). All three devolved territories relied 
on direct support from the UK government to pursue their aims, but their actions 
also influenced the Westminster debate and subsequent vote for a full ban 
(Cairney, 2009: 476-7). 
 
Consequently, there were four separate windows of opportunity in which attention to the 
problem varied, the same solutions were available, and policymakers in each territory had 
the motive to pursue different forms but often a limited opportunity to do so. Early 
devolved efforts, by the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament 
member’s bill, focused on areas such as public buildings and restaurants, with pubs and 
clubs initially exempt; their efforts were delayed by uncertainty over legislative 
competence; the subsequent successful Irish experience (coupled with party competition 
in Scotland) ensured that a full ban was technically and politically feasible; and, when 
policymakers had the ability to ensure change, their willingness to pursue greater 
restrictions was more apparent. In separate debate, the UK Government pursued a partial 
ban, initially exempting pubs and then only clubs, before MPs voted for a complete ban 
following unusually public health pressure and pub industry support (it preferred a full 
ban to the exemption for its competitor clubs) (2009: 481).  
 
In other words, there is a strong element of contingency to the production of a 
comprehensive ban on smoking in public places, even when the UK policy environment 
had become relatively conducive to tobacco control (and the UK was a signatory to the 
FCTC). Crucially, in a country with a trajectory towards becoming the most controlled in 
Europe, a full ban on smoking in public places was not inevitable. A voluntary then partial 
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ban was always a realistic possibility, and a full ban could only have happened in a 
particular point in time (from the mid-2000s) during a window of opportunity. This is key 
context in which to consider the reduced likelihood of a similar ban in any country – 
including Japan - with a policy environment less conducive to control.  
 
In Japan, the Kanagawa prefectural government first introduced the Passive Smoking 
Prevention By-Law (Regulation) in 2009 (a similar measure is in place in Hyogo in 2013). 
This policy resembles the partial ban first proposed by UK devolved governments and 
pursued in US states in the early 2000s. This more limited change relates to the different 
nature of the ‘streams’ in Japan: 
 
 Attention to, and framing, the problem. One opinion poll, conducted by the 
prefectural government, showed that 88% of respondents (69% of smokers; 92% 
of non-smokers) agreed with restricting smoking in public places and there was 
some media support for the legislation (e.g., The Asahi Shimbun, 20/04/2008). 
These factors helped encourage the governor to introduce the legislation. 
However, the majority of restaurants, pubs, hotels and amusement facilities were 
small businesses, and most owners expressed dissent (Matsuzawa, 2009). 
Further, there still remained strong adherence to the idea of smoking as a 
personal choice or economically favourable product. 
 The development of feasible solutions mediated in the policy community. 
Practices in other places, such as New York City, Ireland and Hong-Kong 
contributed to the discussion and development of policy options (Matsuzawa, 
2009). However, although supportive of tobacco control, public health and 
medical groups did not lobby energetically, in public, to pass a bill. This reticence 
reflects a general tendency to have fewer campaigning resources, and to restrict 
their efforts largely to civil servants rather than political parties (Tusjinaka and 
Pekkanen, 2007). The federations of restaurants, pubs, hotels and amusement 
facilities, expressed concern about suffering economic damage (which could be 
limited by a partial ban only) and JTI opposed a full ban smoking (Matsuzawa, 
2009). 
 The motive and opportunity to select a solution. While policymakers in the 
central government are reluctant to introduce the bill, the new system of 
intergovernmental relations gave local governments the power to legislate by-
laws and introduce fines to regulate behaviour. The dual representation system 
enabled the governor of Kanagawa prefectural government to initiate his own 
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legislature regardless of intention of the assembly. Yet, the three main parties and 
groups, the LDP, Komeito and Kenseikai, shared the majority of the assembly, 
and opposed introducing a total ban on smoking in public places (Matsuzawa, 
2009). The assembly worked as a ‘veto player’ against the governor’s legislation. 
 
The assembly exerted power to restrict the bill’s provisions. In 2008, the LDP, Komeito, 
and Kenseiki opposed introducing a total ban. So, before the bill was formally introduced 
to the assembly, the prefectural government amended it several times. By the final stage 
of discussion in the assembly in March 2009, LDP, Komeito and Kenseikai group still 
planned to introduce an alternative bill. This bill would expand more significant 
exemptions than the original, and postpone the enforcement of administrative fines for 
two years. The confrontation between the governor and majority of the assembly peaked 
and the possibilities of failing to pass the original bill increased. At the last phase, to break 
the deadlock, the chair of the assembly negotiated a compromise. The governor accepted 
more amendments and the (Regulation) of Prevention of Passive Smoking in Public 
Places bill was passed in the Kanagawa prefecture in March 2009 (Matsuzawa, 2009). 
Perhaps the most important symbol of Japanese policy is that, even in the leading 
prefecture, no administrative fine has been issued (The Asahi Shimbun, 19/06/2011). 
Instead, the government is doing all it can to persuade small business owners and 
subsidise their redevelopment to accommodate the new policy.  
 
Overall, the Kanagawa experience demonstrates a window of opportunity only for a 
partial ban, while the political cost of a full ban remains too high for its governor. There 
is high public support only for limited policy change. The governor could not draw on a 
groundswell of public and interest group support for his proposed changes. On the 
contrary, the Kanagawa prefectural government had to spend a lot of policy resources to 
form consensus among interest groups and acquire political legitimacy for the bill. 
Crucially, its experience is a best case scenario in Japan right now: there is limited 
opportunity to pursue tobacco control and a small minority of governors have the motive.  
Conclusion: identifying the conditions for evidence-based tobacco policy  
The scientific evidence on tobacco harm is identical in both countries, but there remains 
a major difference between tobacco policies, because the UK’s tobacco policy 
environment has become far more conducive to policy change. By no means did it 
guarantee a shift to comprehensive tobacco control, but it maximised the chance that 
policymakers would have the motive and opportunity to select relatively strong tobacco 
instruments during each window of opportunity. In contrast, Japan’s tobacco policy 
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environment constrains opportunities for policy change even if key actors have the 
motivation to select strong measures. Over time, these differences accumulate to produce 
vastly divergent policies. 
 
We identify broad and specific ways in which to understand these developments. The 
party of government seemed to be crucial, and the UK now has more venues – such as 
the EU and devolved governments - for issue expansion. We also focus on the importance 
of a wider environment, in which actors at multiple levels compete to frame tobacco as 
an epidemic or economic product, establish which venue’s (departments of health or 
finance) rules matter, form networks in government, and interpret socioeconomic trends. 
Such dynamics underpin the selection of specific instruments during windows of 
opportunity. 
 
These broad and detailed comparative accounts help us identify the conditions under 
which the scientific evidence, on the size of the tobacco problem and the availability of 
effective solutions, translates into a public policy response that its advocates would 
consider to be proportionate.  
 
First, although scientific evidence helps reduce uncertainty, it does not reduce ambiguity. 
There is high competition to define problems, and the result of this competition helps 
determine the demand for subsequent evidence. In tobacco, the evidence on smoking and 
then passive smoking helped raise attention to public health, but it took decades to 
translate into a proportionate response, even in leading countries such as the UK. The 
comparison with Japan is crucial to show that the same evidence can produce a far more 
limited response, as policymakers compare the public health imperative with their beliefs 
on personal responsibility, civil liberties, and the economic consequences of tobacco 
control. Consequently, the first condition is that actors are able to use scientific evidence 
to persuade policymakers to pay attention to, and shift their understanding of, policy 
problems. This outcome is far from inevitable.  
 
Second, this debate plays out in policy environments more or less conducive to policy 
change. In the UK, actors used scientific evidence to help reframe the problem; this new 
and dominant understanding helped give the Department of Health a greater role; the 
health department fostered networks with public health and medical groups at the expense 
of the industry; and, it emphasised reductions in opposition to tobacco control, alongside 
reduced smoking prevalence and economic benefits to tobacco, when pursuing policy 
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change. In Japan, these conditions are far less apparent: there are multiple tobacco frames; 
the Ministry of Finance is still central to policy; the industry remains a key player; and, 
policymakers pay more attention to vocal opposition to controls and their potential 
economic consequences. These differences have endured despite both countries signing 
the FCTC. Consequently, the second condition is that the policy environment becomes 
conducive to policy change. Scientific evidence plays a part in reshaping that environment, 
but in the UK it took decades and it has yet to occur in Japan. 
 
Third, even in favourable policy environments, it is not inevitable that major policy 
changes will occur. Rather, the UK experience shows the high level of contingency in the 
coupling of high attention to tobacco, the production of solutions introducing partial or 
comprehensive bans on smoking in public places, and the willingness and ability of 
policymakers to choose the more restrictive solution. In Japan, there has been no 
comparable window of opportunity, while the opportunity for a partial ban has only been 
produced by very few subnational governments. Consequently, the third condition is that 
actors generate and exploit windows of opportunity for major policy change. This 
condition shows the limits to the effect of scientific evidence. The evidence on the health 
effects of passive smoking have been available since the 1980s, but they only contributed 
to comprehensive bans in the UK in the mid-2000s, and they seem a long way off in Japan.  
 
Such experiences should help advocates of evidence-informed policymaking recognise 
that the production and dissemination of scientific evidence is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for major policy change. Key actors do not simply respond to new information: 
they use it as a resource to further their aims, to frame policy problems in ways that will 
generate policymaker attention, and inform technically and politically feasible solutions 
that policymakers will have the motive and opportunity to select. This remains true even 
the evidence seems unequivocal and when countries have signed up to an international 
agreement which commits them to major policy change. Such commitments can only be 
fulfilled over the long term, when actors help change the policy environment in which 
these decisions are made and implemented. 
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